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Michael Shapiro* and Ellen Warhit**

Marketable Permits: The Case of
Chlorofluorocarbons
Disclaimer: The analyses and interpretations presented in this paper
are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views
of the Environmental Protection Agency.
INTRODUCTION
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are a group of chemicals which have been
suspected of causing destruction of stratospheric ozone. In 1978, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) prohibited the use of CFCs as
aerosol propellants. In 1980, EPA announced that it was considering the
use of a marketable permit system as a possible option, in the event that
regulation of non-aerosol use of these chemicals was deemed appropriate.
Although the Agency has used somewhat similar regulatory approaches
in its bubble and offset programs under the Clean Air Act, those initiatives
have been overlaid on an existing, extensive regulatory structure consisting of mandatory standards for emissions levels, and are implemented
on a relatively local scale. In the case of chlorofluorocarbons, the marketable permit system was evaluated for application as a basic regulatory
approach on a nationwide scale. As such, the chlorofluorocarbon case
represents a relatively unique instance in EPA's efforts to consider the
use of economic incentives in place of traditional regulations.
This paper will focus on the economic aspects of the Agency's considerations as they relate to a marketable permit system. The scientific
aspects of the chlorofluorocarbons issue, while obviously critical from
the standpoint of the Agency's overall policy toward chemicals, will only
be touched upon here. Our basic purposes are to illustrate how considerations of marketable permits evolved from broad concepts to highly
detailed analyses and to describe some of the results of these analyses.
We will begin by providing a brief historical overview of the chlorofluorocarbon ozone issue and of the reasons why marketable permits were
-onsidered as a possible regulatory approach. We will then summarize
some of the detailed economic studies which were conducted for EPA to
Jetermine the costs and impacts of this and other regulatory approaches.
*Chief, Regulatory Impacts Branch, Office of Toxic Substances, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency.
**Economist, Office of Water Regulations and Standards, U.S. Environmental Protecton Agency.
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Next we will describe some of the issues which were considered once
the basic results of the economic modeling were available, and will
summarize industry's reactions to the marketable permit approach. We
will conclude with some observations about what we have learned in the
course of this work.
BACKGROUND
Chloroflurocarbons (CFCs) are a group of stable halogen compounds
used in a variety of applications including refrigeration, solvents, blowing
agents, and food freezing. Since 1974, scientists have theorized that when
CFCs are emitted into the atmosphere the compounds migrate to the
stratosphere where they photodisassociate into chlorine and other compounds.
The chlorine is thought to react with ozone, upsetting normal ozone
creation and destruction processes.' Since ozone acts as a shield for
ultraviolet (UV) radiation, a depletion of the ozone layer would increase
harmful UV levels at the earth's surface. Increased UV may have a number
of adverse health and environmental consequences, including increased
incidence of skin cancer, damage to crops and aquatic life, and climatic
changes. Substantial scientific disagreement exists with respect to the
ozone theory and its consequences. Following the theory's articulation
in 1974, additional research and analysis expanded knowledge in the
area, but neither validated nor disapproved the original theory. 2
In response to concern over the ozone depletion problem, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prohibited the use of CFCs as aerosol propellants in nonessential
uses in 1978.1 Several other countries subsequently acted to limit the use
of CFCs as aerosol propellants.
In 1979, the National Academy of Sciences published additional reports
on the ozone depletion question . 4 These reports tended to support the
1. Stolarski and Cicerone, StratosphericChlorine:A PossibleSink for Ozone, 52 CAN. J. CHEMISTRY 1610 (1974); Molina and Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoro
methanes: Chlorine Atom Catalyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974); Crutzen,
Estimates of Possible Future Ozone Reduction from Continued Use of Fluorochloromethanes, I
GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS 205 (1974).
2. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INTERIM REPORT OF THE PANEL ON ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY (1975); and HALOCARBONS: EFFECTS ON THE STRATOSPHERIC
OZONE (1976).
3. 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301-325 (1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §762).
4. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION BY HALOCARBONS: CHEMISTRY AND TRANSPORT (1979); and NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
PROTECTION AGAINST DEPLETION OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE BY CHLOROFLUOROCARBONS (1979).
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earlier concerns, suggesting that the best estimate of ozone depletion was
greater than had earlier been predicted. But again it was not possible to
empirically confirm the ozone depletion hypothesis.
In October 1980, EPA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), stating that it was considering possible regulation of
non-aerosol CFC uses. 5 The Agency solicited comments from interested
parties on the ozone depletion theory and related scientific issues, as well
as economic aspects of possible CFC control measures. The Agency
described a number of regulatory options, including mandatory controls
and variations of two economic incentives approaches-taxes and marketable permits.
What factors led EPA to consider economic incentive approaches for
these chemicals? CFCs have certain characteristics which seem to lend
themselves to the use of economic incentives. In particular, only total
CFC use determines the ultimate damage to the stratosphere. This characteristic is in contrast to most other types of pollutants, where ultimate
environmental impact depends on the specific location and circumstances
of use. For such pollutants, efficient incentive strategies require that taxes
or permits be adjusted to take into account the circumstances of location,
environmental fate and transport. Since the ozone depletion potential of
CFCs does not depend on where or how they are used, either tax setting
or permit trading are greatly simplified. A single tax or permit market
could be employed on a national scale to efficiently regulate CFC activities. While various CFCs differ in their ability to deplete atmospheric
ozone, scientific assessments of this potential can be used to define a
relatively straightforward weighting scheme. Again, however, there is no
need to tailor either a tax scheme or a permit system to take local variation
into account.
A second major advantage seems to arise from the nature of CFC
markets. CFCs are used in many applications by large numbers of small
firms. Limited use regulations could be extremely difficult and costly for
EPA to enforce effectively. Moreover, it is virtually impossible for EPA
to take into account the large variation in individual users' production
and control cost functions in attempting to develop an efficient set of
mandatory regulations. However, given a general limit on CFC production
and use or a tax, there are a variety of options available to users who,
faced with rising CFC costs, would voluntarily implement these options.
These factors convinced a number of Agency analysts that economic
incentives approaches should be seriously considered. As a result, a series
of detailed analyses of these options were undertaken.
5. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,726-734 (1980).
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ECONOMIC MODELING

The Rand Corporation provided economic analysis support to EPA
through a series of contracts beginning in 1976.6 Rand gathered basic
background data on the markets and technologies involved in the various
uses of CFCs and their feedstocks, and developed a simulation model
which related CFC use to price. This model was then used to evaluate
the costs and effectiveness of various regulatory options for a 10 year
period, from 1980 to 1990.
The market segments and the CFC categories considered by Rand are
listed in Figure 1, along with 1976 use data. Three CFC types were
included in the model: CFC 11, 12 and 113. While other CFC types are
used commercially, they were not included in the Rand analysis because
their potential for depleting stratospheric ozone was much lower than that
of CFCs 11, 12 and 113. The use estimates are presented in weighted
pounds, where CFCs are weighted by their relative potential to deplete
FIGURE 1
CFC USES-1976
WEIGHTED
CATEGORY
FLEXIBLE URETHANE FOAMS
SOLVENTS
RIGID FOAMS
MOBILE AIR CONDITIONERS

CFCs

USE
106 POUNDS

11

34

113
11, 12

53
55

12

71

CHILLERS
HOME REFRIGERATORS AND FREEZERS
RETAIL FOOD REFRIGERATION SYSTEMS

11, 12
12
12

12
5
9

MISCELLANEOUS

11, 12
TOTAL

18
257

6. A. PALMER, W. MOOZ, T. QUINN, & K. WOLF, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
REGULATING CHLOROFLUOROCARBON EMISSIONS FROM NONAEROSOL APPLICATIONS (The Rand Corp.-Contract No. R-2524, 1980); W. MOOZ & T. QUINN, FLEXIBLE
URETHANE FOAMS AND CHLOROFLUOROCARBON EMISSIONS (The Rand Corp.-Contract No. N-1472, 1980); K. WOLF, REGULATING CHLOROFLUOROCARBON EMISSIONS:
EFFECTS ON CHEMICAL PRODUCTION (The Rand Corp-Contract No. N-1483, 1980); A.
PALMER & T. QUINN, ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF A CHLOROFLUOROCARBON PRO.
DUCTION CAP (The Rand Corp.-Contract No. N-1656, 1981); A. PALMER & T. QUINN,
ALLOCATING CHLOROFLUOROCARBON PERMITS: WHO GAINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHAI
IS THE COST? (The Rand Corp-Contract No. R-2806, 1981).
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ozone. CFC 11, which has the greatest potential, is assigned a weight of
one.
Eight market sectors were included in the model:
1. Flexible UrethaneFoams. CFCs are employed as blowing agents
to produce flexible urethane foams used in furniture, automotive
seats, bedding, carpet underlay and in other products as cushioning materials.
2. Solvents. CFC 113 is used as a solvent in industrial cleaning and
degreasing operations.
3. Rigid Foams. Like flexible foams, rigid foams utilize CFCs as
blowing agents. Rigid foams are used to provide insulation in
construction, refrigeration and transportation applications, and in
a wide variety of consumer products, including cups, food chests,
fast food packaging, flotation devices, etc.
4. Mobile Air Conditioners. CFC 12 is used as the refrigerant in
these conditioners.
5. Chillers. Air conditioning systems used in large commercial and
industrial buildings are known as chillers. CFCs 11 and 12 are
utilized in many of these units as the primary refrigerants.
6. Home Refrigerators and Freezers. Such appliances use a rela-

tively small quantity of CFC 12.
7. Retail FoodRefrigeration. CFC 12 is used in medium temperature

food refrigeration systems which store meat and dairy products
for display.
8. Miscellaneous. The remaining uses for CFCs include sterilants,
liquid fast freezing systems for foods, and a variety of miscellaneous uses, some of which may become significant in the future.
For each of the major use areas, substitutes or emissions reduction
technologies were identified. These control measures are listed in Figure
2.
In three areas-flexible foams, rigid foams, and solvents-non-CFC
substitutes can be used for at least a portion of the CFC applications. A
CFC substitute, CFC 502, is feasible in retail food refrigeration applications and would have much less ozone depletion potential than CFC
12. Similarly, less depleting CFCs can be used in place of the standard
CFCs in testing chillers and refrigeration equipment. Finally, recovery
and reuse of CFCs is possible in flexible and rigid foams, solvents, and
during servicing or salvage of mobile air conditioning equipment.
These control measures do not reflect the full range of technically
possible control options. The basic approach was to select those technologies that could be implemented without much further development.
In addition, Rand excluded certain costly control measures that would
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FIGURE 2
CFC CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES
CONTROLS

USE
FLEXIBLE URETHANE FOAMS

-CFC Recovery
-Substitution (Methylene Chlroide)

SOLVENTS

-Reduced Vapor Loss
-Increased use of reclaimed material
-Substitute Solvents

RIGID FOAM

-CFC Recovery
-Substitution (Pentane)

MOBILE AIR CONDITIONERS

-Recovery

CHILLERS

-Different

HOME REFRIGERATORS AND
FREEZERS

-NONE

RETAIL FOOD REFRIGERATION

-Substitutes for Leak Testing
-Substitute Refrigerant (CFC 502)

MISCELLANEOUS

-NONE

at Service or Salvage
Test Gases

not yield substantial emissions effects until far beyond the study's 10 year
horizon.
The cost of each control option was estimated using an engineeringcost approach for typical facilities in each application area. CFC use
reduction by category was computed against baseline projections determined from available trends and forecasts of activity in each application.
Using these data, a series of annual demand curves were generated,
assuming that firms would act as cost minimizers, adopting those CFC
use reduction measures that would be economical at each hypothetical
CFC price level. Since CFCs are inputs to the production of other products, a full specification of the derived demand for CFCs also required
specification of the final product demand curves. In most instances these
were assumed to be completely inelastic in order to insure that regulatory
costs were not underestimated. Because CFCs constitute an extremely
small percentage of the final product cost, even at very elevated prices,
this assumption would not yield results too far from the truth.
Figure 3 is an example of the type of demand curves which were
generated. The graph summarizes the demand for all CFCs considered,
weighted by their potential to deplete ozone.' The vertical axis is the
7. All subsequent references to pounds of CFC are intended to indicate pounds weighted for
potential to deplete ozone.
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FIGURE 3
DEMAND CURVE FOR CFCs-1980

250

260

270

280

290

300

310

320

330

340

350

360

MILLIONS OF WEIGHTED POUNDS

price increase per pound of CFC 111 and the horizontal axis is the total
number of pounds. The points on the graph indicate the prices at which
different CFC users would find it less costly to substitute for CFCs or
employ technological controls.
These demand curves provide the basic tool for evaluating economic
incentives policies. According to Figure 3, a tax of one dollar per pound
of CFCs would reduce use by 54 million pounds in 1980, from 340 to
286 million pounds. Equivalently, a production limit set at 286 million
pounds would increase the CFC price by roughly one dollar per pound
in 1980. As the demand curve shifts to the right in subsequent years, the
price would increase.
The basic model was used to evaluate a number of policy options,
three of which are described here. The first is a mandatory control scenario. 8 Rand selected a benchmark set of mandatory control measures:
-Recovery and recycling of CFC in flexible foams;
8. PALMER, MOOZ, QUINN & WOLF (1980), supra note 6.
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-Equipment standards for cleaning and drying;
-Conversion to R-22 test gas in the manufacture of chillers and
retail food refrigeration systems; and
-- Conversion to CFC-502 refrigerant in medium temperature retail
food refrigeration systems.
As represented in Figure 4, this benchmark set of controls would yield
a cumulative reduction of 608 million pounds from 1980-1990 at a present
value resource cost of $185.3 million 1976 dollars.
FIGURE 4
EXAMPLE RESULTS

Control
Option

Present Value
of Resource
Costs 1980-90

Total CFC
Reduction
1980-90
Pounds

CFC Price
Increase
Per Pound

1. MANDATORY
CONTROL
BENCHMARK

$185

(106)

608 (106)

2. ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES
EQUIVALENT TO (1.)

$108 (106)

610 (106)

$.70

3. PRODUCTION
AT 1980 LEVELS

$275 (106)

1,200 (106)

$0.09
0.94
2.80

Present Value
of Transfers
1980-90

--

$1,720 (106)

(1981)
(1985)
(1990)

$1,829 (106)

The second option is an economic incentives approach that would yield
a cumulative CFC reduction equivalent to the mandatory control case.
An economic incentives strategy which increased the CFC cost by about
70 cents per pound would yield the same level of reduction at a total real
cost of about $108 million dollars, about 40 percent less than the mandatory controls. 9

These calculations, however, illustrate the difficulty of doing this type
of ex ante comparison as much as they illustrate the efficiency of a market
based approach. We could develop a mandatory control set that would
be just as efficient as the market solution from the standpoint of the
model: we would simply take the market solution control measures and
make them mandatory. Rand assumed that some of the control measures9. Id.
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primarily those associated with substitutes-were not realistic mandatory
options because they were not enforceable. Because of the many small
users and the widespread availability of CFCs, some argued that meaningful enforcement of a mandatory use ban of CFC in certain applications
would not be feasible. The entire efficiency gain of the market approach
is generated by the exclusion of these "non-enforceable" options from
the mandatory set. At the same time, the analysis omits the key savings
of a market approach-that is, the ability within each use area for the
individual firms to optimize their selection of technology. This comment
is not a criticism of the Rand work; omissions of this type are inherent
in the nature of these kinds of analyses.
Recognizing these limitations, the 40 percent cost advantage for the
market based approaches is still significant and was a major factor in
encouraging further serious attention to this policy option. At the same
time, the market based approach was predicted to incur $1.72 billion
dollars in transfer payments due to higher prices which, according to the
assumptions of the model, would ultimately be borne by consumers of
the final products.
A more extensive level of control is used in the third case which is
based on a hypothetical regulation that would limit CFC production to
the 1980 level of 340 million pounds. In order to simulate this degree of
control toward the latter half of the decade, some of the model's assumptions about fixed technology and perfectly inelastic demand were
relaxed. This policy option was projected to reduce CFC production by
1200 million pounds from 1980 to 1990, at a present value resource cost
of $274.7 million dollars.' 0 Transfer payments would amount to $1.83
billion dollars; the price premium for a weighted pound of CFC would
increase to $2.80 by 1990. In comparison, the base price of CFCs 11,
12 and 113 were $.34, $.52, and $.78 per weighted pound, respectively.
Had the policy been instituted, by 1985 more than half the price of CFCs
would be comprised of the transfer payment resulting from the production
cap.
Rand evaluated a number of other scenarios and provided a wealth of
data on CFC markets and potential economic consequences of CFC regulation. Based on these studies, a number of conclusions could be drawn:
First, economic incentives would result in significant transfer payments
from final consumers. Indeed, these transfer payments would be several
times the magnitude of the actual resource costs of CFC controls, as
illustrated in the examples just discussed. And despite real resource savings, all use segments would experience greater total costs under an
10. PALMER & QUINN (1981, Contract No. N-1656), supra note 6. 4"
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economic incentives approach than under a comparable mandatory regulation scheme.
Second, there are relatively few options for reducing CFC use in the
near future. This is particularly true in areas such as refrigeration where
there are presently no viable substitutes.
Third, even where substitutes were available potential problems existed. Some of the substitutes were themselves the subjects of ongoing
scientific and regulatory review for possible health and environmental
effects. This raised the possibility that economic incentives for CFC
reduction, without concurrent regulations on other products, could induce
the use of undesirable substitutes. This outcome would be-true, of course,
for some forms of mandatory regulation as well.
Fourth, under an economic incentives approach, the initial allocation
of costs among industries using CFCs would be very different than under
a mandatory control scheme. Certain users do not have viable substitute
or control options. They would probably not face mandatory regulation
but would incur transfer payments associated with the economic incentives
policies being considered.
Finally, it is at least arguable that, given the steep marginal cost curve
for controlling CFCs, a tax policy would have advantages over a marketable permit system. Under a marketable permit system the transfer
payments would be very sensitive to small changes in the level of CFC
production allowed. On the other hand, small changes in the tax rate
would not significantly affect the level of control. Therefore the tolerance
for error might be greater in a tax approach.
ALLOCATION SCHEMES
Since the quantitative estimates seemed to suggest that an economic
incentives approach was a viable and possibly advantageous mechanism
for controlling CFCs, Agency economists and regulatory analysts continued to devote considerable attention to this option in the months prior
to the publication of the ANPR. At that stage attention focused on how
such a mechanism would be implemented in order to further define the
strengths and weaknesses of the approach. One basic consideration, which
heavily influenced the subsequent work, concerned the legal status of
certain options. It was the staff opinion, although not universally shared,
that EPA did not have the authority to either impose a CFC tax or to
auction permits, although the Agency could distribute marketable permits.
For analytical purposes staff work proceeded under the assumption that
neither the tax nor auction options were open. This decision created two
problems. First, as discussed previously, there may be reasons to prefer
a tax scheme to permit systems. More importantly, the Agency would
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have had to develop an allocation scheme that would ultimately determine
how the large transfer payments would be distributed.
Many variations of allocation mechanisms were considered, but ultimately three types of policies received the greatest attention: allocation
to manufacturers, allocation to first line buyers, and allocation to end
users (Figure 5). Allocations in each case would have been proportional
to historical use or production measured over some time interval. None
of these approaches changed the nature of the theoretical market solution
predicted by the Rand model. Consumers would still wind up bearing
the ultimate cost of the CFC permits and the same production, employment and use decisions would occur. The three approaches differed markedly in administrative complexity and cost, and had very different
distributional consequences.
FIGURE 5
ALLOCATION OPTIONS
Allocation To:
MANUFACTURERS

END USERS

FIRST LINE USERS

No. of Firms

Comments

5

Administratively simple; results
in large wealth transfer to a
few major firms

About
200,000

Widest allocation of transfers,
many small firms would benefit; complex administrative
problem

4000-5000

Intermediate level of complexity; inequalities in treatment of
similar firms due to differences
in distribution patterns

Allocation to manufacturers would be the simplest administratively,
since there are only five domestic manufacturers, and imports are relatively insignificant. According to Rand's estimates, the wealth transfer
in the case of a production cap at 1980 levels would more than offset
any losses the manufacturers would incur from the reduced value of their
CFC production assets. 1 Stockholders in these firms would thereby realize
a net increase in their equity value. However, the large and visible transfer
to a few large firms raised a number of concerns about equity despite the
relative ease with which this option could be implemented.
At the opposite extreme, permits could be allocated to end users,
11. PALMER & QUINN (1981, Contract No. R-2806), supra note 6.
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defined as those who actually produce or service a product. These would
include manufacturers and servicers of refrigeration and mobile air conditioning equipment, foam blowers, solvent users and so forth. This
scheme would distribute the transfers the most widely of any of the three
options and to a large number of small firms, although some of the final
users, such as automobile manufacturers, would still be extremely large.
At the same time, allocation to end users would create an administrative
nightmare for the Agency. As many as 200,000 firms might be involved
in total. The Agency would have to gather and verify CFC purchase
records for these firms in order to make the initial allocations, as well as
rule on an endless series of special cases and appeals.
A seemingly better solution was the intermediate case of allocation to
first line purchasers-those who bought CFCs directly from the manufacturers. Such purchasers number about 4000-5000, presenting a more
manageable, although by no means trivial, administrative problem for an
Agency that does not regard its mission as that of economic regulation.
There would, however, be some potentially controversial inequities. Due
to differences in market and distribution structures, similar firms would
get treated very differently. For example, among foam blowers significant
regional differences exist. Those in one part of the country deal directly
with the manufacturer while those in another part work through a large
distributer. Within any particular industry segment, larger firms are more
likely to buy directly from manufacturers than smaller firms and hence
would be more likely to capture the transfers associated with the permits.
These three approaches suggest the kinds of problems that would have
to be grappled with, should the Agency ever implement a marketable
permit system. Other related issued were also being considered at the
same time. For example, should permits be issued as perpetuities or should
they have a time limit associated with them? How should we treat imported
products that already contain CFCs or have used CFCs in their production
process? Allocative mechanisms other than those discussed here were also
analyzed. At the time the ANPR was proposed, the Agency had no preferred mechanism for implementing a marketable permit policy in the
event that CFC regulation was undertaken, nor had the Agency determined
that the permit concept was a viable regulatory approach.
The Agency received over 2500 comments on the ANPR. CFC manufacturers and users had a variety of responses. Many of the comments
had to do with the scientific and international aspects of the ozone depletion issue. With respect to the use of economic incentives, industry's
reaction was very negative. Some of that negativism could be attributed
to a lack of understanding and general confusion surrounding the use of
economic incentives. The policy was relatively novel and many were
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concerned that only the wealthy firms would be able to afford CFC
permits, while smaller firms and those with capital availability problems
would be precluded from the permit market. Those concerned envisioned
hoarding permits and black markets for CFCs.
More generally, there was considerable concern that the imposition of
a permit system would lead to significant changes in the structure of CFC
use and distribution industries. Even in areas such as distribution, which
analysts believed would be less likely to be harmed than other CFC
sectors, 12 many small firms apparently believed that a permit system would
provide an opportunity for larger firms and even manufacturers to take
over their markets.
It may be that some of the concerns regarding industry structure were
not justified; however, researchers had not done detailed analyses of these
issues, and in the face of considerable skepticism could offer only theoretical arguments. In other areas analysis had previously addressed the
comments' concerns in considerable detail, but without apparent effect.
For example, there was concern that a CFC production cap would limit
CFC availability for refrigeration and air conditioning applications, where
there were no available substitutes. But precisely for this reason, the Rand
analysis had shown that these uses would be the least affected by a
production cap, except for some substitution among CFCs and some
conservation efforts in testing and servicing. Consumers would pay higher
prices, but for example, by 1990 this would amount to a price increase
of about seven dollars for home refrigerators and six dollars for mobile
3
air conditioners. '
Industry was also uncomfortable with the various allocation schemes.
Ironically, not even those who would gain through the allocation scheme
favored the permit system. For instance, CFC manufacturers argued that
they did not want the permits to be allocated to them because they did
not want the responsibility of choosing who would get the CFCs and who
would not. The manufacturers felt they would be too visible and it was
not worth reaping the ill-will they believed the permit system would
create.
CFC users were concerned not only because they feared a lack of
availability with no viable substitutes but also because, even if CFCs
were available to them, there was a significant degree of uncertainty
surrounding future CFC prices. For instance, some argued that they would
be reluctant to make significant investments in recovery and recycling

12. Id.
13. Id.
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technologies and other CFC reducing expenditures based solely on Rand's
projections of future CFC demand and price.
In general, industry was reluctant to be subject to a new regulatory
approach. Although mandatory controls might be less efficient than economic incentives, the former approach was a known entity. Industry
understood its ramifications and felt more comfortable with it than with
the unknowns associated with the more innovative regulatory approach.
CONCLUSIONS

In the Spring of 1982, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published an update on the causes and effects of stratospheric ozone reduction. 14 NAS projected that "if production of CFCs continued into the
future at the rate existing in 1977, the steady state reduction in total
ozone, in the absence of other perturbations, would be between five
percent and nine percent."' 5 In 1979 NAS had predicted a most likely
ozone depletion of from 15 percent to 18 percent. 16 Intensive scientific
study of the issue is continuing, and EPA is funding significant parts of
this effort. In light of the updated information, as well as the economic
analyses described above and responses to the ANPR, the Agency is
currently determining what actions if any, should be undertaken in the
near future. Regardless of whether further regulation of CFCs is ultimately
undertaken, we believe that the analysis of the CFC marketable permit
scheme has contributed significantly to understanding of this regulatory
tool. We have certainly learned some important lessons:
* Initially, and for considerable time thereafter, EPA focused predominantly on the efficiency gains in looking at economic incentives policies. By the end of the present round of analysis the
transfer payments had come to draw most of the attention. We did
not anticipate this development and as a consequence were not as
well prepared for it as we might have been.
" Our thinking tended to ignore short-run transition effects, focusing
instead on equilibrium type analysis. This is true of most regulatory
analyses, but was perhaps more of a problem in this case because
of the relatively unique nature of the regulatory transition being
contemplated.
" On the positive side, economic arguments and analyses have had
an important impact on the Agency's deliberations. Agency decision makers have been willing to consider relatively novel ap14. Id.
15. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE
REDUCTION: AN UPDATE (1982).
16. Id.at 31.
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proaches where they are supported by good analysis and are presented
effectively.
On the negative side we grossly underestimated the difficulty of
introducing and explaining the marketable permit concept to potentially affected parties. The ANPR, in the absence of other mechanisms for public information, was not a good vehicle for introducing
the idea. The agency has been successful in introducing the bubble
and offset concepts in air quality control. But in these examples
the measures were introduced as reforms which could lower regulatory costs relative to existing standards which set absolute limits
on emissions for each source. The CFC permit systems we were
considering would have increased costs to most parties (except
the permit owners) relative to mandatory controls, and the ANPR
gave no indication of who the ultimate winners might be. The fact
that real resource costs would be lower was not viewed as a
significant consolation. In light of this, and the relative novelty
of the approach, we should not have been surprised that the concept
described in the ANPR met with widespread antagonism and misunderstanding. These problems were further aggravated by the
absence of specifics in the ANPR as to how the policy would be
implemented.

